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A 24-hour exchange market was created on the Web to trade political futures contracts using
fictitious money. In this online market, a political futures contract is a futures contract which ma-
tures on the election day with a liquidation price determined by the percentage of votes a candidate
receives on the election day. Continuous double auctions were implemented as the system for order
storage and price discovery. We drew market participants in the form of tournaments in which
top traders won cash awards. Such a market was run, with about 400 registered traders, during
the U.S. presidential election in November 2004 and Taiwan parliamentary election in December
2004. The experiments recorded transaction price, highest bid, lowest ask, and trading volume of
each contract as a function of time. Despite the relatively small scale of the exchange, in terms
of the number of participants and duration of the tournament, we report evidence for asymptotic
power-law behaviors of the distributions of price returns, trading volumes, inter-transaction time
intervals, and accumulated wealth that were found universal in real financial markets.
PACS numbers: 05.40.Fb,05.45.Tp,89.90.+n
INTRODUCTION
Markets are a complex system that usually consists of
the following different types of participants: (i) produc-
ers who provide goods, (ii) speculators or hedgers who,
with beliefs in the trends of price movements, buy low
and sell high for a profit or insurance, and (iii) arbi-
trageurs who buy products at a low price in one mar-
ket and sell them at a high price in other markets for a
riskless profit. A market is liquid if sufficient numbers
of the different types of players exist in symbiosis. To
study the system, successive movements in observables
such as price are modeled as a stochastic process due to
market’s responses to the random arrivals of information.
Fluctuations are predicted to be Gaussian[1] or Le´vy[2]
distributed by the central limit theorem. Distributions
of large price changes, those which exceed, say, five stan-
dard deviations, however show characteristic power-law
behaviors[3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. Models to explain
the power-law range from systems at the state of self-
organized criticality exhibiting scale free properties in the
order parameters[13], to evolutionary systems[14] whose
constituents interact through a social network[15, 16, 17].
In an attempt to experimentally study market behav-
iors, we created an online marketplace that hosts the
three types of market players mentioned above[18]. In
this market, a player, after free registration for an ac-
count on our exchange server[29], was allocated a fixed
(and common) amount of fictitious money to start with.
We defined the so-called political futures contracts[19, 20]
and held trading tournaments that gave cash awards
to those who fared well in their account wealth at the
end of the tournament[18]. A political futures contract,
say Bush-Cheney, is a futures contract whose liquida-
tion price is set by the percentage of (electoral College)
votes the Bush-Cheney ticket receives on November 2,
2004, when the contract matures. A player who believes
George W. Bush would win the election would buy in
shares of Bush-Cheney when the market price of a Bush-
Cheney is low (e.g. below 50). In addition to Bush-
Cheney and Kerry-Edwards futures contract, we also is-
sue Others to account for votes for independent candi-
dates. The sum of the price of each share of Bush-Cheney,
Kerry-Edwards, and Others is 100 if the market is ratio-
nal, deviations from 100 of the sum at any time provid-
ing opportunities for arbitrageurs. Players submit bid or
ask limit (or market) orders online which are matched at
real time on our server by the mechanism of continuous
double auctions[21] which is widely used in real world fi-
nancial exchanges. The design of tournament is aimed at
recruiting serious participants who are believed to make
prudent decisions when they have a stake in the engage-
ment.
Two tournaments were launched for anyone who had
access to the Web. The first, between October 4 and
November 3 of 2004, was on the 2004 U.S. presidential
election while the second, between November 11 and De-
cember 12 of 2004, on the 2004 Taiwan parliamentary
election[30]. The exchange server, open 24 hours a day
7 days a week, recorded data including the transaction
price, volume traded, highest bid, and lowest ask with
time of each contract. The result shows a scaling prop-
erty in the probability densities of price returns over
a range of time lags τ across 2 orders of magnitudes
(55 min < τ < 8103 min). The central region of the
densities can be described by a Cauchy distribution (a
stable Le´vy distribution which decays slowly as a power
law of an exponent 2) while the tails by a power law, the
2FIG. 1: Price time-series for the futures in the 2004 U.S.
presidential election. Others represents votes received by all
candidates others than Bush-Cheney and Kerry-Edwards.
exponent of which depends on whether transaction prices
or means of the bid-ask spread are used in obtaining the
densities. The distribution of changes in trading volume
was found to follow a Gaussian distribution while that
of large trading volume can be fitted by a power law.
The distribution of players’ wealth, which started from a
delta function, was found power law distributed when the
tournament ended. The distribution of inter-transaction
time intervals was also found to follow a power law. De-
spite the fact that the money is fictitious and the scale of
the exchange is small in terms of the number of players
and time span, the results reproduced many properties
characteristic of real financial markets. If we consider a
tournament as an experiment, by observing changes in
the statistical properties of the market observables with
changes in rules of the exchange, we expect the platform
to shed light on the principles that govern socioeconomic
behaviors.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Due to the nature of the futures, tournaments were
scheduled to start one month before the election day and
ended on the election day when the futures matured. Re-
cruiting as many players as possible presented a great
challenge to researchers who lacked marketing channels.
What was done was to post news about the tournament
to college campus bulletin boards throughout Taiwan[18].
Numbers of registrations increased with time and reached
364 and 498 respectively for the U.S. presidential and
the Taiwan parliamentary election near the end of the
tournaments. There was a change in the rules between
FIG. 2: Price time-series for the futures in the 2004 Tai-
wan parliamentary election. Labels, except NON, are the
acronyms of the major political parties participating in the
election. NON stands for all candidates other than the four
major parties.
the two experiments.[31] In the U.S. case, submitted or-
ders waited in the orderbook for matching orders until
expired otherwise. In the Taiwan case, orders could be
canceled before they expired. Note that contracts could
by no means be bought (sold) from (to) oneself. Figures
1 and 2 show the price time-series for each contract in
the two experiments. Time is measured in minutes since
midnight of January 1, 1970 UTC (coordinated univer-
sal time). The higher frequency of trades in the second
experiment reflects the change in rules. Our analysis of
data thus focuses on the second experiment unless other-
wise stated. Interpretation of the price movements and
accuracy and precision of the prediction of the time-series
on election outcomes are beyond the scope of this paper.
We briefly mention here that vote-share rankings by the
means of the price time-series correctly mirrored the elec-
tion outcomes in both experiments, which is also true for
our earlier experiment on Taiwan presidential election in
March 2004[18].
DATA ANALYSIS
During the tournament, information arrives stochasti-
cally and the time intervals between successive transac-
tions are irregular. To generate a time series at a constant
time interval of 1 minute, we bin time into discrete values
with a resolution of 1 minute. Prices in a time bin are
then averaged. A value of zero, meaning no transactions
in that time bin, is replaced with the price in the previ-
ous time bin. There are thus a total of 43430 data points
3FIG. 3: Time-series for the bundle price (black) and total
volume (red) for the 2004 Taiwan parliamentary election.
in such price time series corresponding to the duration of
the tournament in minutes. For volume time series, no
such padding is performed, however. Only 8340 nonzero
data points were recorded in the volume time series. The
ratio of 8340 to 43430 indicates that the market was ac-
tive 19% of the time.
We call the portfolio consisting of a share of DPP,
KMT, NON, PFP, and TSU a bundle. Similar to a stock
index which is a (weighted) sum of the stock prices of the
representative companies, we sum the five price time-
series of the individual futures contracts to obtain the
price time-series of a bundle. Figure 3 shows the time-
series of the summed prices and summed trading vol-
umes. Hereafter, the analysis will be on such summed
observables unless otherwise stated.
There appear many large fluctuations in Fig. 3. To
study occurrence of the fluctuations, we calculate the
difference between the logarithmic price logS(t) at time
t+ τ and that at time t,
Gτ (t) = logS(t+ τ)− logS(t), (1)
and the normalized price return,
gτ (t) =
Gτ (t)− µτ
στ
, (2)
where µτ and στ are the mean and standard deviation
of Gτ (t). Figure 4 superposes the probability densities
of the return gτ at five different time lags: τ = 55, 148,
403, 1097 and 8103 minutes, which are roughly evenly
spaced in a logarithmic scale. The scaling behavior of
price returns over time lags spanning over 2 decades was
well documented[3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12] and rem-
iniscent of the phenomena of self-organized criticality in
some physical systems[22, 23].
FIG. 4: Probability density of normalized price returns with
time lag equal to 55 (red), 148 (black), 403 (yellow), 1097
(green) and 8103 (blue) minutes. Dashed line is obtained from
a Cauchy distribution and dotted line a Gaussian distribution
of unit variance.
FIG. 5: Probability density of normalized volume changes
with time lag equal to 55 (red), 148 (black), 403 (yellow),
1097 (green) and 8103 (blue) minutes. Dotted line is obtained
from a standardized Gaussian distribution.
In parallel to changes in price, we calculated normal-
ized volume changes and plot the probability densities in
Fig. 5, which, unlike the fat tails in Fig. 4, coincides with
a standardized normal distribution. The normality indi-
cates that, unlike price fluctuations, volume fluctuations
are independent[1] over the range of time lags tested.
Another distribution of interest is that of volumes[24]
which we show in Fig. 6. A straight line fit of the distri-
4FIG. 6: Probability density of volume traded (log trans-
formed). The straight line results from a linear regression
fit to the large volume data points, giving a slope of -3.9.
bution pV for large trading volumes V gives,
pV ∼
1
V 3.9
. (3)
At the end of the tournament, we liquidated the futures
contracts left in players’ accounts, the wealth of which
can then be calculated. Recall that every player was allo-
cated an amount of 3100 (units of fictitious money) when
his account was opened. If the account wealth remains to
be 3100 after liquidation, the account is deemed inactive.
To obtain the distribution of wealth, we removed inactive
accounts, leaving 319 active ones. The wealth distribu-
tion pW of the active accounts is shown in Fig. 7, a linear
fit to which suggests a power law distribution[25, 26],
pW ∼
1
W 2.1
. (4)
DISCUSSION
The fat tails in the distribution of price returns
have long been observed and suggested to be power-law
distributed[3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. We performed
a linear fit to the log transformed probability density of
g148 for g148 > 4 and obtained an asymptotic density
pg148 for the normalized returns g148,
pg148 ∼
1
g1484.9
. (5)
We note however that the exponent can differ if different
constructions of time series are used. In the above, we
FIG. 7: Probability density of wealth (log transformed). The
straight lines result from linear regression fits to the whole
range of the wealth, giving a slope of about 2. Black and red
are, respectively, for the 2004 Taiwan parliamentary and 2004
U.S. presidential election.
padded missing prices using the last transaction price.
The interpolation is valid under the assumption that
players consider the current price fair and thus do not
bother to buy or sell. However, one can argue that the
lack of transactions only reflects the fact that no one is
online during the time bin, rather than an agreement on
price among players. We therefore also analyzed the data
without padding. In this case, the difference between
prices at t+τ and t can only be formed when both prices
exist, resulting in a drop in statistics. Nevertheless, Fig.
8 shows the scaling behavior of the (normalized) price re-
turns thus formed g′τ . The exponent of the positive tail
of the density of g′
148
is now 3.1,
pg′
148
∼
1
g′
148
3.1
. (6)
The exponents of the price returns are outside the sta-
ble Le´vy regime. In Fig. 9 is plotted the autocorrelation
functions of the price returns and the absolute value of
the price returns. Note that data are truncated at time
lag equal to 298 minutes, where the first negative auto-
correlation of |G1(t)| occurs. It is seen that the autocor-
relation of price returns drops to the noise level in about
half an hour, after which the market is considered effi-
cient. Higher order correlations however persist longer,
as seen in the slow decay of the autocorrelation of the ab-
solute value of the price returns in the bottom panel of
Fig. 9, suggesting that traders have long range memories
of the magnitude of price changes[5, 27, 28].
Our exchange server, which was open 24 hours a day
7 days a week, received orders from online players who
5FIG. 8: Probability density of normalized returns with time
lag equal to 55 (red), 148 (black), 403 (yellow), 1097 (green)
and 8103 (blue) minutes. Returns are calculated from the
transaction prices. Dashed line is obtained from a Cauchy
distribution and dotted line a Gaussian distribution of unit
variance.
FIG. 9: Autocorrelation function of G1(t) (top) and |G1(t)|
(bottom). A slope of -0.26 results from a linear regression fit.
submitted their orders in response to random arrivals of
information on campaign activities. An order was car-
ried out only when it intersected with a matching order
before it expired. When orders were matched, transac-
tion took place. We calculated the time intervals between
successive transactions. Figure 10 shows the plot of the
numbers of transactions versus inter-transaction time in-
FIG. 10: Distribution of inter-transaction time intervals (log
transformed). The straight line is from a linear regression fit
to the data points but the first one, having a slope of -1.2.
tervals measured in minutes. It is seen that the numbers
decay asymptotically in a power-law fashion with an ex-
ponent of 1.2. The non-exponentiality of the distribution
indicates that transactions do not take place randomly
in time, even though orders are assumed to be submitted
randomly in time.
A limit order is placed with an upper bound for buying
(or lower bound for selling) a volume of shares, expiring
in a period of time specified by the bidder (seller). A mar-
ket order, on the other hand, buys (or sells) from (to) the
existing orders in the orderbook, and is executed imme-
diately after it is received on our server. We can there-
fore say that cautious traders tend to use limit orders
while impatient traders use more market orders. The ef-
fect of the limit order-limit order interactions and limit
order-market order interactions on the price is interest-
ing. Each futures contract has its lowest ask and highest
bid price as a function of time. We summed the five time
series to form the lowest ask and highest bid time series
of the bundle. In Fig. 11 is plotted the time series, which
are seen to flank the price time series of Fig. 3. We cal-
culate the arithmetic mean of the lowest ask and highest
bid at any time and obtain a time series, the scaling prop-
erty of which is shown in Fig. 12. The spread of the tails,
compared with that in Fig. 4, does not seem to support
the exacerbating effect of market orders. However, since
the market was thin, players might have learned quickly
to avoid placing market orders. More studies are needed
to understand the impact of market orders.
In our experiment, an equal amount of money was
made available to the market whenever a new player
joined the tournament. Players’ money was redistributed
via trading as the tournament went on (a player owned
6FIG. 11: Lowest ask and highest bid time-series of the 2004
Taiwan parliamentary election.
on average 11 shares of each contract in the experiment).
We showed in Fig. 7 that the distribution of wealth af-
ter the 2004 Taiwan parliamentary election is power-law
distributed. In the independent experiment on the 2004
U.S. presidential election, we also examined the wealth
distribution of the active players (235 in this case) and
found a similar exponent for the power law (red line in
Fig. 7). The Paretian property appears robust consider-
ing the lower changeover rate of the futures contracts in
the 2004 U.S. presidential tournament than in the 2004
Taiwan parliamentary tournament (cf. Figs. 1 and 2).
The asymptotic fat tailed distribution of price fluctua-
tions also appeared in the 2004 U.S. presidential tourna-
ment as we carried out a similar analysis on the time se-
ries despite their lower statistics. Formation of the Pare-
tian wealth distributions could be attributed to the large
price fluctuations, not the frequency of trades, according
to our experiment. To study the effect of different trading
rules (social insurance policies) on wealth redistribution,
we can, for example, charge a fee (tax) on every trans-
action (income). We can also study the dynamics by
sampling the wealth distribution along the tournament.
A simple survey of the geographical and occupational
information on the top 20 players indicates that they
do not know one another in person, suggesting that so-
cial networks are not necessary to explain the power law
property of the price returns and wealth. The decay
times in the price autocorrelation functions differ. In
particular, the decay time of the DPP price autocorrela-
tion function is found the longest, suggesting that there
were more DPP supporters in the tournament or that
the DPP supporters were more loyal. Dependencies of
the price changes could be caused by the collective ac-
tions of segments (coalitions) of participants of different
FIG. 12: Probability density of normalized price returns with
time lag equal to 55 (red), 148 (black), 403 (yellow), 1097
(green) and 8103 (blue) minutes. Returns are calculated from
the arithmetic means of lowest asks and highest bids. Dashed
line is obtained from a Cauchy distribution and dotted line a
Gaussian distribution of unit variance.
genres, contributing to the large fluctuations.
In summary, we have presented an approach to study
the principles underlying complex and strongly fluctu-
ating socioeconomic systems. Futures contracts corre-
sponding to a social event were designed. Futures trad-
ing experiments with well defined initial conditions were
then set up. Participants were recruited and contributed
to the study via the Internet. Market observables such
as transaction price, trading volume, bid ask price, were
recorded at real time. Scaling behaviors were found in
the distributions of price returns and trading volume sim-
ilar to those found in real financial markets. Power law
behaviors were also found in the distributions of inter-
transaction time intervals as well as participants’ wealth.
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